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From Handbills to Proposed Bills: Suggestions for 
Regulating the Las Vegas “Strip” Tease 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The world-class resorts that shape Las Vegas’ neon skyline draw 
millions of visitors each year. These tourists are the lifeblood of the 
local economy, and they come to enjoy the attractions and 
accommodations densely concentrated along Las Vegas Boulevard. 
This resort district, known as the Strip, offers visiting pedestrians 
stunning architectural views, inexpensive meals, live sidewalk shows, 
and access to numerous hotel-casinos. However, while these 
attractions have been proven to effectively generate profits for resort 
owners, another force now aggressively competes for the time and 
attention of would-be resort patrons. 
Visitors walking along the Strip are constantly bombarded with 
adult-themed handbills distributed by off-premises canvassers.1 The 
majority of this material depicts graphic advertisements for referral 
services that provide erotic dancers directly to visitors’ hotel rooms.2  
Because of its dense concentration of relatively new resorts, the 
Strip is often inundated with pedestrians using inadequately sized 
sidewalks to travel between attractions.3 This congestion has created 
 
 1. See Joint Answering Brief of Appellees, S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark, 152 F.3d 
1136 (9th Cir. 1998) (No. 97-15912); see also Order (Case Nos. CV-S-97-0123-LDG(RJJ), 
CV-S-97-0146-LDG(RJJ)) at 3, 6 (D. Nev. March 4, 1997); CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE 
OF ORDINANCES 16.12.020(5) (1997) (defining “off-premises canvassing” as distributing 
handbills on public sidewalks). 
 2. Joint Answering Brief of Appellees, supra note 1, at 7–8; Joe Schoenmann, County 
Takes Aim, Again, at Strip Handbillers, LAS VEGAS SUN (May 6, 2010, 2:00 AM), http:// 
www.lasvegassun.com/news/2010/may/06/plan-g-no-news-racks-allowed; Dave Toplikar, 
Mayor Opposed Escort Service Handbillers on Fremont Street, LAS VEGAS SUN (Jan. 20, 2011, 
2:30 PM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2011/jan/20/mayor-opposed-escort-service-
solicitors-fremont-st.   
 3. CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE OF ORDINANCES 16.12.010 (1997) (“Since, 
traditionally, the major emphasis along the Strip has been on automobile transportation and 
not on pedestrians, the existing pedestrian environment is inadequate as a transportation 
system and lacking in many safety features. Moreover, a great number of persons are engaged 
in use of the public sidewalks to conduct off-premises canvassing which creates undue 
obstruction, hindrance, blockage, hampering, and interference with pedestrian travel and 
littering of the public sidewalks . . . . The activities of these congregating canvassers coupled 
with competition frequently result in the harassment of pedestrians. Large numbers of 
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what county commissioners have termed a “captive audience” for 
opportunistic adult outcall businesses, which use canvassers to 
obstruct high-traffic areas, effectively forcing their handbills on 
visitors.4 To make matters worse, the frequency of pedestrian delay 
has increased significantly during recent years as a result of fierce 
competition between outcall services. Because each service aims to 
outsell its competitors, each has the incentive to have the largest 
canvassing presence in the most congested locations.5 This 
“competitive cycle” has resulted in a glut of handbillers lining both 
sides of the Strip’s bottlenecked sidewalks, creating gauntlets of 
graphic advertising “through which pedestrians must pass and in 
which the pedestrians are forced to take the proffered advertising.”6 
Occasionally, pedestrians wishing to avoid the graphic material are 
forced into the dangerous street as they attempt to bypass the 
cordons of canvassers.7 
This competitive and congested atmosphere has resulted in 
tourist harassment, physical disputes among canvassers, and extreme 
amounts of sexually charged litter.8 These conditions directly affect 
resort patronage, particularly at the resorts abutting premium 
canvassing locations.9 As a result, between 1994 and 1996, 
numerous resorts and other businesses brought civil actions to enjoin 
canvassers from engaging in such obstructive and abusive practices. 
 
pedestrians are walking in the streets to avoid harassment and the congested public sidewalks 
and many pedestrians are crossing against the traffic signal indications.”). 
 4. Joint Answering Brief of Appellees, supra note 1, at 7–9. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 9. In many locations, these gauntlets include as many as twenty or more 
canvassers strategically positioned in confined areas of narrow sidewalks. Id. 
 7. Id. at 18–19, n.17 (One canvassing representative “admitted during cross 
examination that he and his competitors would specifically target sidewalk areas with heavy 
pedestrian volume . . . for distribution of their commercial advertisements, that commercial 
canvassers would stand ‘shoulder to shoulder,’ all ‘to slam a tourist with a book,’ that he 
himself observed a lot of fights among the canvassers on the sidewalks, that the canvassers 
would threaten and harrass [sic] tourists and call them names, that they would engage in 
violent confrontations over the prime ‘hot spots’ on the resort district’s sidewalks, and that 
pedestrians would be forced off the sidewalks and into the streets as a result of these 
activities.”); see CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE OF ORDINANCES 16.12.010 (1997); 
Schoenmann, supra note 2. 
 8. Joint Answering Brief of Appellees, supra note 1, at 10–11. 
 9. See Liz Benston, Peddlers, Performers Clogging the Strip are Troubling to Casinos, 
LAS VEGAS SUN (July 27, 2011, 2:00 AM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2011/jul/27 
/human-clutter-strip-troubling-resorts/. 
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This led to the issuance of over twenty court orders concerning 
pedestrian abuse.10 
Recognizing the need to regulate aggressive canvassing tactics, 
Clark County has repeatedly attempted to enact a legislative 
solution. In 1994, county commissioners enacted the Obstructive 
Use Ordinance in an effort to alleviate sidewalk congestion by 
criminalizing pedestrian obstruction.11 Unlike later restrictions, this 
ordinance did not implicate canvassers’ expressive rights, but instead 
prohibited them from “stacking and storing their distribution 
materials on sidewalks.”12 However, as is evident from the litany of 
injunctions issued after its passage,13 the Obstructive Use Ordinance 
failed to prevent pedestrian obstruction. 
In 1996, the county made a second legislative attempt to resolve 
its persistent concerns for pedestrian safety. It patterned the new 
ordinance after a law previously enacted in Key West, Florida, a 
tourist community with similar canvassing problems. On its face, the 
Key West ordinance completely banned all off-premises canvassing in 
the city’s tourist district,14 and, like the Clark County ordinance, it 
was enacted only after less restrictive efforts had failed. The Key West 
model was attractive to Clark County’s commissioners because it was 
both demonstrably effective and had survived a First Amendment 
challenge at the Eleventh Circuit.15 
Clark County’s version of the ordinance, known as Section 
16.12, took effect on January 1, 1997, and made it a misdemeanor 
to engage in “off-premises canvassing” within the Las Vegas Resort 
District.16 Like the Key West ordinance, Section 16.12 specifically 
defined “off-premises canvassing” as “distributing, handing out, or 
offering, on public sidewalks, handbills, leaflets . . . or other printed 
or written literature . . . which . . . propose one or more commercial 
transactions.”17 
 
 10. Joint Answering Brief of Appellees, supra note 1, at 11. 
 11. CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE OF ORDINANCES 16.11.010 (1997). 
 12. Joint Answering Brief of Appellees, supra note 1, at 12 (citing CLARK COUNTY, 
NEV., CODE OF ORDINANCES 16.11.070 (1997)). 
 13. Id. at 11. 
 14. Id. at 13. 
 15. Id. at 13–14 (citing Sciarrino v. City of Key West, 83 F.3d 364 (11th Cir. 1996)). 
 16. CLARK COUNTY, NEV CODE OF ORDINANCES 16.12.040(a), (d) (1997). 
 17. CLARK COUNTY, NEV CODE OF ORDINANCES 16.12.020 (5) (1997). 
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On January 31, 1997, the operators of two Nevada-based outcall 
services filed suit in a U.S. district court challenging the 
constitutionality of the ordinance as it applied to their businesses. 
Shortly thereafter, the ACLU intervened as a plaintiff, contending 
that the ordinance facially violated the First Amendment, because it 
regulated both commercial speech and “fully protected 
noncommercial speech that is inextricably intertwined with 
commercial speech.”18 The district court disagreed and subsequently 
denied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction.19 
The following year the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the 
ACLU had demonstrated the probable success of its claim.20 
Consequently, the matter was remanded, and the county was 
enjoined from enforcing the ordinance.21 Nine years later, the district 
court ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutionally overbroad.22 
To date, the county has failed to enact a comprehensive solution 
to the canvassing problem, which some believe is threatening 
Nevada’s “economic engine” by “tarnishing the Strip’s image as a 
safe and fun place for tourists.”23 While resort executives “have long 
expressed concerns to county commissioners about various 
nuisances—handbillers of sexual entertainment in particular”24—the 
county has neither enacted nor enforced an ordinance directly 
regulating obstructive canvassing since the Ninth Circuit’s injunction 
in 1997.25 This lack of legislative progress, however, should be 
 
 18. S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark, 152 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 1998), amended by 
160 F.3d 541 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 19. Id. at 1141. 
 20. County of Clark, 160 F.3d at 542. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1134 (D. Nev. 2007). 
 23. See Benston, supra note 9; see also Scott Wyland, Some Seek Crackdown Against 
Street Peddlers Strip, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL (Aug. 1, 2011, 1:59 AM), 
http://www.lvrj.com/news/some-seek-crackdown-against-street-peddlers-on-strip-
126503523.html. 
 24. Benston, supra note 9. 
 25. It is worth noting, however, that on Tuesday, August 7th, 2012—months after this 
Comment was accepted for publication—Clark County Commissioners approved an anti-
littering ordinance that will require handbillers to pick up and dispose of handbills discarded by 
passersby every fifteen minutes, in the area within twenty-five feet of where the material was 
distributed. See Kristi Jourdan, Commissioners Pass Law Targeting Litterers on the Strip, LAS 
VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL (Aug. 7, 2012, 5:52 PM), 
http://www.lvrj.com/news/commissioners-pass-law-targeting-litterers-on-the-strip-
165363006.html. While this new law is likely to improve the overall image of the Strip by 
removing much of the sexually charged litter from sidewalks and storm drains, it is not a 
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understood not as tacit approval of aggressive canvassing, but 
instead, as the result of the county’s hesitancy to expose itself to 
another round of First Amendment litigation.26 
Surely there is truth to the argument that obstructive canvassing 
is harmful to the state’s economy. Although the documented 
rationale for enacting Section 16.12 was largely pedestrian safety, it 
would be naive to contend that county officials were not concerned 
about resort profitability. Indeed, the Strip constitutes a major 
source of the state’s revenue and employs a substantial number of 
Las Vegans. Thus, during this time of economic instability and the 
resulting decline in tourism, it is no surprise that county officials 
have been clear about their desire to restore the Strip’s once 
appealing image.27 
However, despite the county’s interest in attracting tourists, it 
must also consider the high costs associated with attempts to 
regulate speech. For example, when Clark County enacted and 
defended Section 16.12, it not only failed to resolve its concerns, but 
also became embroiled in a costly ten-year legal battle, which 
resulted in an award of attorney’s fees and almost a quarter–million 
 
compressive solution to the county’s obstructive canvassing concerns. On its face, it does 
nothing to limit where, when, or how canvassers may approach or obstruct pedestrians. 
Instead, it simply imposes a new burden on canvassers. To be sure, this added inconvenience is 
likely to adversely affect canvassing profits, but there is little reason to believe that it will result 
in a noticeable reduction in obstructive practices. This, presumably, is why county 
commissioners are once again reviewing proposals for an ordinance that would regulate 
obstructive canvassing as a safety concern. See Jane Ann Morrison, County Targets Strip Pests 
One Animal, Panhandler at a Time, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL (Jul. 2, 2012, 2:00 AM), 
http://www.lvrj.com/news/county-targets-strip-pests-one-animal-panhand ler-at-a-time-
161047405.html (noting that one interest group alone has developed thirty-two such 
proposals, and that the county recently commissioned a $581,000 study of congestion on the 
Strip, which it intends to use when drafting a final ordinance); see also Kristi Jourdan, County 
Orders Study of Strip Pedestrian Congestion, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL (Apr. 4, 2012, 7:20 
AM), http://www.lvrj.com/news/county-orders-581-000-study-of-strip-pedestrian-
congestion-146006445.html (explaining that in April 2012, “commissioners approved [the] 
$581,000, three-month study to identify areas where pedestrian movement is congested on 
[the Strip],” and that it will be used to inform proposed code amendments aimed at 
“regulating commercial activity on sidewalks”). Thus, despite the county’s new anti-littering 
law, a discussion about a defensible ordinance directly regulating obstructive canvassing is as 
relevant now as it has ever been. 
 26. See Morrison, supra note 25 (suggesting that county commissioners have been slow 
to enact proposed solutions to the obstructive canvassing problem because of the strength of 
canvassers’ First Amendment concerns); see also Benston, supra note 9. 
 27. Schoenmann, supra note 2. 
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dollars in damages.28 Certainly, the prospect of facing another similar 
defeat has, to some degree, chilled efforts to enact a regulation 
reflective of the commission’s actual position on canvassing.29 Thus, 
county commissioners are stuck in the proverbial “damned if you do, 
damned if you don’t” position: on one hand, they cannot afford to 
allow aggressive canvassers to perpetuate a further decline in tourism, 
and on the other, they must consider the high costs that will likely 
follow another judicially rejected attempt at effective regulation. 
This Comment addresses these competing concerns by 
evaluating three possible regulatory models in terms of both utility 
and defensibility. It proceeds by (1) demonstrating that the 
privatization of canvassing regulation is likely to be found 
indefensible if challenged in either state or federal court; (2) 
exploring the inescapable problem with regulating canvassing 
through the commercial-speech doctrine; and (3) proposing the 
adoption of a narrowed version of the content-neutral, time, place, 
and manner restriction upheld by the Supreme Court in Hill v. 
Colorado.30 
II. PUBLIC V. PRIVATE PROPERTY: A DISTINCTION WITHOUT A 
DIFFERENCE 
In the wake of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling on Section 16.12, Clark 
County has essentially attempted to privatize canvassing regulation 
by supporting the exclusionary efforts of private-property owners.31 
On the surface, this appears to be an attractive solution for two 
reasons: first, it allows the owners of “mega-resorts,” who often own 
the sidewalks immediately abutting their properties, to 
independently restrict a substantial amount of undesired canvassing. 
Second, it leaves the county itself unexposed to the risks of First 
Amendment litigation. Of course, the immediate drawback to this 
approach is that canvassers excluded from private property will 
presumably relocate to already congested publicly owned sidewalks. 
 
 28. Joe Schoenmann, The Likely Price of Lost Battle over Handbillers, LAS VEGAS SUN 
(Nov. 16, 2008, 2:00 AM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2008/nov/16/likely-price-
lost-battle-over-handbillers; S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark, No. 2:97-CV-0123 LDG(RJJ), 
2008 WL 700293 (D. Nev. Mar. 13, 2008). 
 29. See Morrison, supra note 25; see also Schoenmann, supra note 2. 
 30. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000). 
 31. Joint Opening Brief of Appellants at 5–6, S.O.C., Inc. v. Mirage Casino-Hotel, 23 
P.3d 243 (Nev. 2001) (No. 34563). 
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The county, though, seems willing to bear this cost because doing so 
allows at least some resort owners to preserve a visitor friendly 
atmosphere.32 Moreover, under existing Nevada case law, it is 
tempting to conclude that this partial solution is legally sustainable. 
Indeed, in 2001, when canvassers challenged Mirage Resorts’s right 
to exclude, the Nevada Supreme Court announced in a plurality 
opinion that privately owned sidewalks immediately abutting resort-
owned properties were not subject to full First Amendment 
protections.33 However, a thorough examination of the Mirage 
decision reveals that its precedential value is questionable at best. 
This is further evidenced by a Ninth Circuit decision handed down 
less than two months later, in which the court held that a nearly 
identical portion of privately held sidewalk, located just across the 
street, was a public forum subject to full First Amendment 
protection.34 Ultimately, these cases suggest that canvassers are likely 
to prevail in future challenges to resort owners’ exclusionary efforts, 
and consequently, that it is only a matter of time until the county 
will need to consider a new regulatory model. 
A. The Mirage Decision: An Illusory Support for the Resort Owner’s 
Right to Exclude 
The portion of sidewalk at issue in Mirage was privately owned 
by Mirage Resorts (the Mirage) and immediately abutted the rest of 
the resort property.35 Consistent with the theme of its Treasure 
Island hotel, a section of the sidewalk is built from wooden planks 
slightly elevated several feet above the ground. Signs indicating that 
the property is privately held by the Mirage are located at various 
points along the passageway.36 In 1993, in order to comply with 
local zoning and licensing requirements, the Mirage conveyed to 
Clark County “a perpetual pedestrian easement over, under, and 
across the parcel of land” on which the sidewalk at issue was 
located.37 The legal description of the easement states that it is a 
 
 32. See generally id. 
 33. Mirage, 23 P.3d at 248. 
 34. Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Las Vegas, 257 F.3d 
937, 948 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 35. Mirage, 23 P.3d at 245. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
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“pedestrian easement for the west right-of-way of Las Vegas 
Boulevard.”38 The county required the easement, because 
constructing the Treasure Island required the elimination of publicly 
owned sidewalks.39 
In 1999, the Mirage filed suit seeking preliminary and permanent 
injunctions against two outcall services (known as 
S.O.C./Hillsboro), claiming that the corporations were trespassing 
by directing canvassers to distribute handbills on the Treasure Island 
walkway.40 A Nevada trial court granted the preliminary injunction 
and S.O.C./Hillsboro appealed.41 The Nevada Supreme Court 
eventually upheld the Mirage’s right to exclude the canvassers, but it 
left the public forum question largely unsettled. Writing for the 
plurality, Justice Young focused on two principal issues: (1) whether 
the easement contemplated the type of canvassing at issue; and (2) if 
it did not, whether the walkway actually constituted a public forum, 
warranting full First Amendment protection.42 He began with an 
analysis of the easement itself, concluding that a narrow reading of 
its express language limited its scope to pedestrian travel.43 As a 
consequence, he noted, the easement “does not contemplate use by 
commercial businesses seeking to advance their own economic 
gains,”44 and therefore, any such commercial activity constitutes an 
actionable trespass.45 
He next addressed S.O.C./Hillsboro’s alternative claim that, as a 
public forum, the Treasure Island sidewalk is subject to full First 
Amendment protection. He began with a brief history of public 
forum jurisprudence, noting that “[t]he United States Supreme 
Court has formulated an approach to the protection of free speech 
based largely on the type of forum involved.”46 In the Perry decision, 
the Supreme Court identified three types of forums: (1) the 
“quintessential public forum,” which “encompasses ‘places which by 
long tradition or government fiat have been devoted to assembly and 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 245–46. 
 41. Id. at 246. 
 42.   Id. at 246, 248. 
 43. Id. at 247. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 248. 
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debate,’ such as streets and parks”; (2) the semipublic forum, which 
includes “public property which the state has opened for use by the 
public as a place for expressive activity”; and (3) the “‘nonpublic 
forum,’ which consists of property that is neither by tradition nor 
designation a forum for public discourse.”47 
Using this framework, Justice Young opined that 
S.O.C./Hillsboro had blithely attempted to characterize the 
Treasure Island sidewalk as a public forum. He explained that the 
mere opening of walkway for pedestrian travel is not in itself 
indicative of a public forum, and that any rule to the contrary would 
“paint[ ] too broad a stroke” over the property owner’s fundamental 
right to exclude.48 While he did not expressly call for further proof 
that the walkway either traditionally attracted public discourse or was 
intended to invite expressive activity, he went on to cite numerous 
cases rejecting similar claims for lack of such evidence.49 
However, Justice Young’s public forum analysis was rejected by 
three of the five members of the court. While concurring in the 
result, Chief Justice Maupin wrote separately, contending that the 
walkway was a public forum. He began by noting that the public 
forum issue was conclusively settled by the federal district court in 
Venetian Casino Resort v. Local Joint Executive Board.50 In Venetian, 
a resort owner excluded union members from picketing on a private 
pedestrian walkway in front of the Venetian Casino Resort. In that 
case, however, a federal district court judge concluded that the 
sidewalk was a public forum, reasoning that it “was previously public, 
serves as a thoroughfare along a main public road, and serves the 
needs of the general public.”51 
Although Justice Maupin concluded that the federal district 
court’s public forum rule must also apply to the practically identical 
Treasure Island walkway, he contended that the Mirage’s exclusion 
of the commercial canvassers was nevertheless permissible.52 He 
 
 47. Id. at 248–49 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 
45 (1983)). 
 48. Id. at 249. 
 49. Id. at 249–50 n.40. 
 50. Id. at 252. At the time of the Mirage decision, the Venetian case was pending before 
the Ninth Circuit. The effects of the Ninth Circuit’s decision are discussed below. 
 51. Venetian Casino Resort v. Local Joint Exec. Bd., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1036 (D. 
Nev. 1999). 
 52. Mirage, 23 P.3d at 252 (Maupin, J., concurring). 
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explained that unlike the political speech at issue in Venetian, the 
speech at issue in Mirage was commercial in nature and, therefore, 
not subject to full First Amendment protection.53 Quoting from the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Metromedia, he asserted that even in 
the traditional public forum, “the difference between commercial 
price and product advertising and ideological communication 
permits regulation of the former that the First Amendment would 
not tolerate with respect to the latter.”54 He then concluded that the 
suppression of S.O.C./Hillsboro’s expression was permissible under 
the test announced by the Supreme Court in Central Hudson,55 
because it appeared to either “solicit offers of illegal prostitution” or 
create a misleading impression of the same.56 
Justice Rose, the lone dissenter, agreed that the walkway 
constituted a public forum, but he did not reach the commercial 
speech issue. Instead, he contended that uncontroverted evidence 
demonstrated that the offers for erotic dance services were merely a 
pretext for offers of illegal prostitution.57 Accordingly, he noted that 
had the lower court determined that the advertisements in fact 
promoted illegal activity, he would have joined the Chief Justice in 
upholding the Mirage’s right to exclude despite the existence of a 
public forum.58 
Therefore, although Justice Young’s plurality opinion suggests 
that resort-owned walkways are not necessarily public forums, it is 
unclear what, if any, precedential weight Mirage carries. In fact, a 
majority of the Mirage justices actually argued that the Treasure 
Island sidewalk was a public forum. This alone indicates the 
possibility that Mirage could prove unfavorable for resort owners in 
future public forum litigation at the Nevada Supreme Court. 
 
 53. Id. (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 
(1980)). 
 54. Id. (quoting Metromedia Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507 (1981) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 55. Id. (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 255 (Rose, J., dissenting). At the district court the Mirage presented a 
substantial amount of evidence tending to show that the offers for erotic dance are a mere 
pretext for prostitution. For example, a detective with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police 
Department’s vice squad testified that acts of prostitution are offered during ninety-five 
percent of sting operations. Respondents’ Answering Brief at 15, Mirage, 23 P.3d 243 (No. 
34563). 
 58. Mirage, 23 P.3d at 255. 
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Furthermore, in light of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Venetian, it 
is almost certain that the Strip’s sidewalk canvassers will eventually 
win on a public forum claim brought in either state or federal court. 
B. The Venetian Appeal 
On appeal from the district court’s Venetian decision, the Ninth 
Circuit held that a section of sidewalk privately held by the Venetian 
Casino Resort was a public forum for the purposes of First 
Amendment protection. The Venetian sidewalk, like its Treasure 
Island counterpart, was created when Las Vegas Boulevard (the 
Strip) was widened to accommodate the construction of newer 
resorts. The construction required adding a travel lane where the 
then-existing public sidewalk was located. Like the Mirage, Venetian 
Resorts agreed to convey a right-of-way easement to Clark County 
and construct a sidewalk on the portion of the property immediately 
abutting the Strip.59 Incidentally, the new Venetian sidewalk was to 
be located directly across the street from the Treasure Island.60 
Shortly after it was completed, a group of labor unions used the 
sidewalk to hold a demonstration protesting the resort’s employment 
practices.61 The Venetian responded by warning demonstrators that 
they were trespassing and requesting police assistance to remove 
those who would not leave. Acting on the advice of the Clark 
County District Attorney, the officers refused to issue citations or 
make any arrests.62 Three days later, the Venetian filed suit in the 
District of Nevada seeking, among other things, a declaratory 
judgment that the sidewalk was not a public forum subject to full 
First Amendment protection.63 The district court reached the 
opposite conclusion and the Venetian subsequently appealed.  
In a 2–1 decision, the Ninth Circuit held that the Venetian 
sidewalk was in fact a public forum. The majority focused its analysis 
on the fact that the original public sidewalk, which was replaced by 
the Venetian’s new walkway, was historically treated as a public 
 
 59. Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Las Vegas, 257 F.3d 937 
(9th Cir. 2001). 
 60. Mirage, 23 P.3d at 252 (Maupin, J., concurring). 
 61. Venetian, 257 F.3d at 940. 
 62. Id. at 940–41. 
 63. Id. at 941. 
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forum.64 It then determined that the new sidewalk, like its 
predecessor, was (1) primarily intended to serve as a thoroughfare for 
pedestrian traffic and (2) was “connected to and virtually 
indistinguishable from the public sidewalks to its north and south.”65 
Therefore, the court concluded, although the new sidewalk was 
physically removed from the previous thoroughfare, it had retained 
all the characteristics of a public forum subject to full First 
Amendment protection.66 
C. The Venetian and the Disappearing Mirage Doctrine 
While the Ninth Circuit’s Venetian ruling is unquestionably 
binding on Nevada’s U.S. District Court, it is also likely to be 
treated as highly persuasive in Nevada’s state courts.67 Consequently, 
because presumably all privately held sections of sidewalk abutting 
the Strip have replaced and are connected to preexisting public 
walkways, any future litigation on the issue will likely result in the 
finding of a fully protected public forum. Nonetheless, one is 
tempted to wonder whether Nevada Courts could still enforce the 
right to exclude by concluding, like Justices Maupin, Shearing, and 
Rose, that the adult-themed handbills constitute only partially 
protected or wholly unprotected commercial speech.68 The answer, 
however, is probably no. In S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark, which is 
discussed in detail below, the Ninth Circuit took the opposite view, 
ruling that S.O.C./Hillsboro’s handbills constituted fully protected 
expression. Thus, as it relates to handbilling on the Strip, whether a 
sidewalk is privately or publicly owned is probably a distinction 
without a difference. Accordingly, it appears that county 
commissioners will need to formulate a new regulatory scheme if 
they intend to permanently restrict obstructive canvassing. 
 
 64. Id. at 943. 
 65. Id. at 943–47. 
 66. Id. at 941–49. 
 67. See Hostetler v. Harris, 197 P. 697, 698 (Nev. 1921); Nash v. McNamara, 93 P. 
405 (Nev. 1908). Of course, in the Mirage decision, Justice Young at least implicitly asserted 
that Nevada was not bound by a federal court’s finding of a public forum. However, relying on 
Mirage seems unadvisable, particularly in light of the majority’s actual position on the public-
forum question. See supra Part II.A. 
 68. See S.O.C., Inc. v. Mirage Casino-Hotel, 23 P.3d 243, 252–53 (Nev. 2001) 
(Maupin, J., concurring). 
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III. REGULATION BASED ON THE COMMERCIAL-SPEECH DOCTRINE 
The core problem with using the commercial speech doctrine as 
the sole justification for an effective canvassing regulation is that it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to narrowly tailor a purely commercial 
prohibition that actually reaches outcall canvassing. 
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a regulation of expressive 
conduct will be held facially unconstitutional if it “seeks to prohibit 
such a broad range of protected conduct that it is unconstitutionally 
overbroad.”69 Of course, the Supreme Court has held that the 
overbreadth doctrine does not apply when an ordinance is directed at 
purely commercial expression.70 However, purely commercial 
expression is defined as “speech which does no more than propose a 
commercial transaction.”71 Accordingly, the commercial-speech 
doctrine will save a statute from an overbreadth challenge only when 
the restriction is limited to purely transactional language, providing 
exceptions for distributed material containing both transactional and 
fully protected speech.72 Therefore, if a purportedly “commercial” 
ordinance is not so limited, it will be deemed to reach beyond 
commercial speech and thus be subject to an overbreadth 
challenge.73 
A. The Inextricable Problem 
In Las Vegas, it seems that both the canvassers and 
commissioners are well aware that the Strip’s graphic handbills 
represent something more than commercial speech. As S.O.C. and 
Hillsboro have argued, they are not in the business of “selling 
 
 69. S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark, 152 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir.), amended by 160 
F.3d 541 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Members of the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for 
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 796 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 70. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977) (refusing to address an 
overbreadth challenge to an ordinance regulating professional advertising for pecuniary gain); 
Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 496–97 (1982) 
(holding that where an ordinance is directed at purely commercial activity the overbreadth 
doctrine is not applicable). 
 71. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Va. Pharm. Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 72. County of Clark, 152 F.3d at 1144 (citing Perry v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 121 F.3d 
1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
 73. See id. 
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hotdogs . . . providing haircuts . . . or providing any other service 
that does not constitute speech.”74 Instead, they are “in the business 
of providing referrals for erotic dance.”75 Accordingly, they contend, 
their speech constitutes only the voluntary distribution of contact 
information for adult entertainers, which is something other than a 
strict commercial proposal. Thus, they conclude, their handbills 
cannot be properly characterized as pure commercial speech.76 While 
this conclusion is certainly subject to plausible counterargument, it 
seems that Clark County Commissioners were persuaded by similar 
reasoning while drafting Section 16.12. 
Rather than limiting the ordinance to regulate only the 
distribution of proposals for commercial transactions, commissioners 
worded it to reach the distribution of materials that (1) “advertise or 
promote commercial transactions,” (2) “specifically or generically 
refer to products or services for sale, lease, or rent,” and (3) are 
“distributed with an economic motivation of commercial gain.”77 
These additional restrictions on expressive conduct seem to indicate 
that commissioners recognized that a purely commercial regulation 
would be insufficient to tackle the canvassing problem. To the 
county’s credit, it seems plausible, even likely, that a court would 
find that referrals containing contact information for erotic dancers 
do not fit within the narrow scope of “proposed commercial 
transactions.” In fact, a similarly strict interpretation of the 
commercial speech doctrine has been applied by both the Ninth 
Circuit and the Supreme Court. 
Emphasizing the need to carefully determine whether a 
purportedly commercial restriction actually reaches protected 
expression, the court in Gaudiya Vaishnava Society v. City of San 
Francisco stated: 
The Supreme Court has recognized that drawing the line between 
“purely commercial ventures and protected distribution of written 
materials [is] a difficult task.” In attempting to distinguish between 
commercial speech and fully-protected speech, the Court in 
Schaumburg held that when a transaction “does more than inform 
 
 74. Opening Brief of Appellants at 29, County of Clark, 152 F.3d 1136 (No. 97–
15912). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 29–30. 
 77. CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE OF ORDINANCES 16.12.050 (5)(a) (1997). 
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private economic decisions and is not primarily concerned with 
providing information about the characteristics and costs of goods 
and services, it [is not treated as] a variety of . . . commercial 
speech.”78 
Thus, because the Strip’s erotic handbills can be characterized as 
providing contact information, or referrals, for dancers, they are 
arguably concerned with something more than simply describing the 
nature and costs of services. Therefore, they are unlikely to be 
treated as purely commercial expression in the First Amendment 
context. This, presumably, is why county officials drafted Section 
16.12 to facially regulate more than purely commercial expression, 
which is precisely why the ordinance is properly subject to an 
overbreadth attack. 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to articulate a commercial-based 
restriction that would both resolve Clark County’s canvassing 
concerns and survive an overbreadth challenge. Section 16.12 
exemplifies why such regulations are unworkable. As recognized by 
the Ninth Circuit, Section 16.12 expressly restricts the distribution 
of material that incidentally refers to products or services for sale or 
material that is freely distributed in a profit-generating scheme.79 
This allows county officials to “prohibit the distribution of 
newspapers, pamphlets, magazines, and other publications that 
contain some form of commercial advertising, even if the 
noncommercial content is unrelated to the advertising copy.”80 
Moreover, under Section 16.12, the county may “prohibit the 
distribution of a newspaper that stresses social, political, and 
environmental issues if the paper’s production costs were covered by 
revenue generated from advertisements,”81 or “a religious 
organization’s newsletter that contain[s] advertisements for its 
members’ businesses.”82 In other words, these extra-commercial 
restrictions allow the county to impermissibly regulate commercial 
 
 78. 952 F.2d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a 
Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 630, 632 (1980) (internal citation omitted)). 
 79. See County of Clark, 152 F.3d at 1144. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. (citing Hays Cnty. Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 114–15 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that distributing a free newspaper that discussed “environmental, peace, and social 
justice issues” was fully protected expression even though its publication expenses were 
covered, in part, by revenue derived from advertisers)). 
 82. Id. 
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expression that is “inextricably intertwined” with a significant 
amount of protected speech.83 As the Ninth Circuit noted, excessive 
regulatory capabilities of this kind are highly indicative that an 
ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad.84 However, as explained 
above, if 16.12 were not so intertwined with protected extra-
commercial expression, a court would likely find the handbillers’ 
“referrals for erotic dance” beyond the ordinance’s reach. Because 
restricting the obstructive canvassing appears to require restricting 
quasi-commercial expression inextricably connected to forms of 
protected speech, it is unlikely that county commissioners will be 
able to draft an effective, commercially-centered regulation that is 
not overbroad in its reach of constitutionally-protected speech. 
B. Commercial Restrictions in Content-Neutral Costumes 
Restrictions on commercial speech, and particularly those that 
regulate extra-commercial speech, cannot be characterized as 
content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions. Nonetheless, in 
response to S.O.C./Hillsboro’s overbreadth challenge, Clark County 
attempted to do just that.85 Addressing this argument, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that Section 16.12 necessarily fails a content-
neutral standard because, by its own terms, it is neither content-
neutral nor narrowly tailored.86 Interestingly, this is presumably true 
of any commercial-based regulation capable of reaching outcall 
canvassers. 
Government-imposed time, place, and manner restrictions on 
protected speech are “valid if they (1) are content-neutral; (2) are 
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest; and (3) 
leave open ample alternative channels of communication.”87 Speech 
restrictions will be deemed content-neutral only when they are 
“justified without reference to the content of the regulated 
speech.”88 This means that a true content-neutral ordinance must 
 
 83. Id. (citing Perry v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 121 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(“[W]here the commercial and expressive parts of speech are ‘inextricably intertwined,’ a court 
[may] not parcel out the protected and unprotected parts of the speech”)). 
 84. Id. at 1144. 
 85. Joint Answering Brief of Appellees, supra note 1, at 56. 
 86. County of Clark, 152 F.3d at 1146–48. 
 87. One World One Family Now v. City & County of Honolulu, 76 F.3d 1009, 1012 
(9th Cir. 1996) (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). 
 88. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
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address only the form, and not the content, of the targeted 
expression. Ordinances restricting commercial speech, however, 
necessarily address content because, by definition, they expressly 
regulate commercial content. Section 16.12 does not avoid this fatal 
defect because, like traditional commercial restrictions, it too targets 
at least some commercial content. 
The advantage to defending a content-neutral restriction is that, 
unlike content-based restrictions, the government need not 
demonstrate that it had a “compelling interest” in restricting the 
speech.89 Instead, a lower standard is imposed, requiring only that it 
show a “substantial interest” in enacting the regulation.90 While 
attempting to defend Section 16.12, Clark County erroneously 
assumed that the court would apply the lower, content-neutral 
“substantial interest” standard.91 Accordingly, it neglected to provide 
“any reason why its interest in aesthetics and traffic safety [were] 
compelling.”92 Nonetheless, even if the county had attempted to 
frame its interests as compelling, the court almost certainly would 
have disagreed. While municipalities may “have a substantial interest 
in protecting the aesthetic appearance of their communities by 
avoiding visual clutter[,] . . . in assuring safe and convenient 
circulation on their streets,”93 and “in preventing solicitors from 
harassing pedestrians on public streets and sidewalks,”94 the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly refused to find such interests compelling.95 
Furthermore, as explained below, even if Clark County could have 
demonstrated a compelling interest, the ordinance would still have 
probably failed for being insufficiently tailored. 
 
 89. County of Clark, 152 F.3d at 1145. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 1146. 
 92. Id. (citing CLARK COUNTY, NEV., ORDINANCE 16.12.010 (1997) (enacting the 
ordinance “[i]n recognition of the need to improve the pedestrian environment, the need to 
maintain accessible sidewalks, the need to prevent harassment of pedestrians, and the need to 
reduce litter”)). 
 93. One World One Family Now v. City & County of Honolulu, 76 F.3d 1009, 1013 
(9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation omitted). 
 94. County of Clark, 152 F.3d at 1146 (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 774 
(1993)). 
 95. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 521 (1981) (plurality 
opinion); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (stating that the “purpose to 
keep the streets clean and of good appearance is insufficient to justify an ordinance which 
prohibits a person rightfully on a public street from handing literature to one willing to receive 
it”). 
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While a content-based regulation on expression will be 
unconstitutional if less restrictive alternatives are available,96 the 
lower content-neutral standard requires only that the regulation not 
be “substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s 
interest.”97 Section 16.12, however, fails to satisfy either tailoring 
standard.98 First, the ordinance is substantially over-inclusive because 
it reaches well beyond regulating those who allegedly obstruct foot 
traffic and harass pedestrians. By virtue of the fact that it reaches 
noncommercial speech inextricably intertwined with commercial 
speech, the ordinance is over-inclusive for the same reason it was 
found overbroad. Indeed, while the county asserted that its interests 
were preventing harassment and alleviating sidewalk congestion, 
Section 16.12 expressly regulates distributors of quasi-commercial 
material, whether or not such canvassers or their materials contribute 
in any way to the county’s stated concerns. 99 
Additionally, and as explained by the Ninth Circuit, Section 
16.12 is also over-inclusive in terms of its geographic scope, because 
it fails to identify specific problematic locations.100 Instead, “it 
categorically bans ‘off-premises canvassing’ along the entire Las 
Vegas Resort District regardless of whether the traffic, safety, and 
litter problems identified by Clark County exist at a given 
location.”101 
Thus, it seems that in order for Clark County to enact a 
regulation based on commercial content that would pass 
constitutional muster, it would have to restrict only purely 
commercial expression in specifically identified locations. Such an 
ordinance, however, is unlikely to resolve the county’s concerns for 
at least two reasons. First, it is possible, if not likely, that the 
canvassing would be found beyond the reach of such a strict 
ordinance. Second, as a practical matter, even if the expression were 
deemed purely commercial in nature, the canvassers could still avoid 
its geographic reach by migrating to the areas of the Strip left 
unidentified by the ordinance. This illustrates the fatal tailoring 
 
 96. See Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980). 
 97. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989). 
 98. County of Clark, 152 F.3d at 1147–48. 
 99. Id. at 1146. 
 100. Id. at 1147. 
 101. Id. 
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defect that would inevitably plague such a geographically restrictive 
ordinance: On the one hand, if the regulation is limited only to 
problematic areas, it is necessarily under-inclusive because of the 
mobile nature of the county’s concern. On the other, as the Ninth 
Circuit indicated,102 if legislatures seek to avoid under-inclusion by 
restricting speech at locations that are not currently problematic, the 
regulation will likely be held to be over-inclusive. 
Of course, the county could attempt to overcome the content 
hurdle by identifying a compelling state interest in regulating extra-
commercial speech. However, given the nature of the county’s actual 
concerns and the infrequency with which such interests are 
recognized, a content-based regulation would likely result in another 
expensive Ninth Circuit loss. Moreover, even if such a compelling 
interest were identified, the county would still face the seemingly 
insurmountable geographic tailoring problem, and it would have to 
resolve it under the even stricter “least-restrictive means” standard. 
Accordingly, it seems that while a purely commercial approach 
cannot adequately address the county’s concern, a further-reaching, 
quasi-commercial restriction is almost certain to fail under another 
First Amendment challenge. Therefore, if the county is sincerely 
interested in a permanent solution, it appears it would be wise to 
look outside of the commercial framework. 
IV. THE RIGHT TIME, PLACE, AND MANNER FOR A WORKABLE 
CANVASSING REGULATION 
At the conclusion of its opinion in S.O.C., Inc. v. County of 
Clark, the Ninth Circuit noted that the county might solve its 
canvassing problem by enacting a truly content-neutral time, place, 
and manner (TPM) restriction on speech.103 In fact, the court went 
so far as to tacitly endorse possible examples of workable 
regulations.104 Of course, while TPM regulations have obvious 
advantages in terms of defensibility, they cannot, by definition, be 
used to completely eliminate the adult-themed canvassing presence 
on the Strip. Therefore, in order for the county to maintain any 
control over the problem, it will likely have to concede to a 
canvassing presence on at least on some parts of the Strip. 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. See id. at 1147–49. 
 104. Id. at 1147. 
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Accordingly, the county’s presumable goal in enacting a TPM 
regulation is to eliminate any and all of the harmful canvassing that 
can be restricted under the First Amendment. Ultimately, and 
somewhat ironically, Las Vegas must take a gamble: if it fails to 
restrict enough canvassing, handbillers will continue to frustrate 
tourists and resort owners, but if it restricts too much, it is sure to 
face defeat in another round of First Amendment litigation. 
However, and as should be expected in Las Vegas, the Strip’s 
regulators can stack the odds in favor of the house. 
While Clark County’s concerns about obstructive canvassing in 
its resort district are relatively unique, several cities have faced similar 
problems in the abortion clinic context. In Hill v. Colorado, the 
Supreme Court upheld a TPM statute that successfully regulated 
obstructive, aggressive leafleting practices occurring near healthcare 
facilities.105 Although the Hill court addressed a regulation on 
expression intended to prevent abortions, its analysis paid little 
attention to the content of the speech and focused instead on the 
harm resulting from the chosen method of expression.106 
Interestingly, the aggressive canvassing methods employed on the 
Strip are strikingly similar in both form and consequence. Thus, by 
looking to the Colorado ordinance as a model for regulating the 
Strip, Clark County may well be able to enact an ordinance 
analogous to the one supported by the Hill Court’s ruling, while 
substantially mitigating the effects of aggressive canvassing on the 
Strip. 
A. Hill v. Colorado 
The Colorado regulation was enacted in response to concerns 
about the accessibility of medical treatment at Colorado healthcare 
facilities. These concerns resulted from the obstructive conduct of 
anti-abortion activists known to gather at abortion clinics and 
aggressively surround incoming patients while thrusting signs and 
leaflets in their faces. Affected patients routinely reported that they 
were offended, intimidated, and physically delayed by demonstrators. 
Likewise, clinic operators testified that the aggressive protesting 
significantly inconvenienced the administration of healthcare 
 
 105. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000). 
 106. Id. 
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services.107 Faced with threats that directly implicated public health 
and safety, Colorado enacted legislation intended to balance citizens’ 
First Amendment rights with the state’s “imperative” interest in 
providing unobstructed access to medical facilities.108 The relevant 
portion of the statute provides: 
No person shall knowingly approach another person within eight 
feet of such person, unless such other person consents, for the 
purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or 
engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such other 
person in the public way or sidewalk area within a radius of one 
hundred feet from any entrance door to a health care facility.109 
Shortly after enactment, protestors challenged the 
constitutionality of the restriction and eventually argued their case 
before the Supreme Court. Writing for a six-member majority, 
Justice Stevens began by discussing the statute’s actual effects on 
protected expression and the propriety of using the “content-
neutral” standard to determine its validity. He explained: 
Although the statute prohibits speakers from approaching unwilling 
listeners, it does not require a standing speaker to move away from 
anyone passing by. Nor does it place any restriction on the content 
of any message that anyone may wish to communicate to anyone 
else, either inside or outside the regulated areas. It does, however, 
make it more difficult to give unwanted advice, particularly in the 
form of a handbill or leaflet, to persons entering or leaving medical 
facilities.110 
Applying the first prong of the content-neutral test articulated in 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, he explained that the statute could 
not be characterized as content based, because it was “justified 
without reference to the content of regulated speech.”111 He 
supported this conclusion by further acknowledging that, on its face, 
the regulation restricted only where certain expressive activities could 
occur, and not the content of the expression itself.112 
 
 107. Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d 1246, 1249–51 (Colo. 1999). 
 108. Id. at 1249 n.4 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122 (1993)). 
 109. § 18-9-122(3) (emphasis added). 
 110. Hill, 530 U.S. at 707–08. 
 111. Id. at 719–20. 
 112. Id. 
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Discussing the significance of the state’s interest, he explained 
that the statutory restriction was intended to “protect those who 
enter a healthcare facility from the harassment, the nuisance, the 
persistent importuning, the following, the dogging, and the implied 
threat of physical touching that can accompany an unwelcome 
approach . . . by a person wishing to . . . thrust an undesired handbill 
upon her.”113 Thus, he noted, Colorado intended to protect the 
“right of ‘passage without obstruction,’” which had been implicated 
by violations of the “right . . . to be let alone.”114 Of course, 
however, the “right to be let alone” is in obvious tension with the 
expressive rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. 
While the right to persuade others is not curtailed simply because 
a listener finds a particular message offensive, the First Amendment’s 
protections do not always reach offensive speech that is so intrusive 
that it cannot be avoided by the unwilling listener.115 Instead, the 
Supreme Court has consistently held that “no one has a right to 
press even ‘good’ ideas on an unwilling recipient.”116 Even in the 
public forum, Cohen’s freedom to wear his vulgar jacket extends 
only insofar as his audience can “avoid further bombardment of their 
sensibilities.”117 Accordingly, and specific to Colorado’s concern, 
“[t]he First Amendment does not demand that patients at a medical 
facility undertake Herculean efforts to escape the cacophony of 
political protests.”118 
The unwilling listener’s interest in avoiding offensive speech 
stems from the broader “right to be let alone,” which Justice 
Brandeis described as the “the most comprehensive of rights and the 
right most valued by civilized men.”119 Of course, “[t]his common-
law ‘right’ is more accurately characterized as an ‘interest’ that States 
can choose to protect in certain situations.” 120 And while this 
 
 113. Id. at 724. 
 114. Id. at 718 (quoting Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970)). 
 115. Id. at 716 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988)). 
 116. Id. at 718 (quoting Rowan, 397 U.S. at 738). 
 117. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (holding that the First Amendment 
protects the right to engage in offensive expression as long as those offended by it can avoid 
it). 
 118. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 772–73 (1994). 
 119. Hill, 530 U.S. at 716–17 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
 120. Id. at 717 n.24 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1967)). 
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interest has special force in the privacy of the home, it may also be 
protected where citizens are in transit.121 This is because of its 
contextual relationship with the right of passage without 
obstruction, which guarantees “as free a passage without obstruction 
as the streets afford, consistent with the right of others to enjoy the 
same privilege.”122 Thus, the critical question is, at what point does a 
demonstrator’s persistence violate the rights of the passerby he 
intends to persuade? According to the Hill majority, it is when the 
speaker continues to importune, follow, intimidate, or otherwise 
obstruct, after his offered communication has been declined.123 Thus, 
because the Colorado statute regulated only speech that interfered 
with the protection of these rights, the Court found that the 
restriction was the product of a significant state interest.124 
Discussing the statute’s tailoring, Justice Stevens began by 
reiterating that “when a content-neutral regulation does not entirely 
foreclose any means of communication, it may satisfy the tailoring 
requirement even though it is not the least restrictive or least 
intrusive means of serving the statutory goal.”125 He then 
demonstrated that the statute neither entirely foreclosed on a 
particular means of expression nor burdened an excessive amount of 
speech. Starting with the regulation on the display of signs or 
placards, he noted that the required eight-foot separation between 
the speaker and audience was unlikely to have an adverse effect on 
the demonstrator’s ability to communicate.126 Moreover, he noted, 
the restriction “might actually aid the pedestrians’ ability to see the 
signs by preventing others from surrounding them and impeding 
their view.”127 
With regard to oral statements, he continued, the distance 
requirement does impose a burden on the speaker’s ability to be 
heard, especially where there is background noise or the speaker is 
competing for attention.128 Nonetheless, it is evident that the statute 
 
 121. Id. at 717. 
 122. Id. (quoting Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 
204 (1921)). 
 123. Id. at 718. 
 124. See id. 
 125. Id. at 726 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989)). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
1316 
is tailored to keep speakers at a distance rather than to quiet their 
message, because it does not limit the speaker’s ability to 
communicate by restricting noise level or the use of amplification 
equipment, even though similar restrictions have been previously 
upheld. 129 More importantly, the eight-foot restriction allows the 
speaker to communicate at a “normal conversational distance” unlike 
the defective fifteen-foot zone rejected in Schenck.130 Furthermore, 
the statute does not require the speaker to relocate when an 
unwilling listener passes within eight-feet of the expression, and it 
imposes a “knowing” requirement to protect speakers who 
mistakenly believe they are maintaining the mandated distance.131 
Consistent with Colorado’s concern, handbilling is the form of 
expression most burdened by the statute. Indeed, it is arguable that 
the eight-foot restriction significantly limits the ability to force 
literature on unwilling pedestrians. However, it does not prevent the 
handbiller from “simply standing near the path of oncoming 
pedestrians and proffering his or her material, which the pedestrians 
can easily accept.”132 Accordingly, the statute primarily burdens the 
speaker’s ability to reach the unwilling listener, and any burden on 
the opportunity to reach the willing recipients is de minimis at best. 
Thus, even the handbilling restriction is consistent with the First 
Amendment, which guarantees the citizen’s right to “reach the 
minds of willing listeners,” by providing an “opportunity to win 
their attention.”133 
Addressing the statute’s geographic tailoring, Justice Stevens 
reasoned that because the restriction applies only within one 
hundred feet of healthcare facilities—where citizens are often in 
particularly vulnerable physical and emotional conditions—the state 
had narrowly limited the restriction to the physical areas where 
obstruction and unwelcomed speech posed the greatest concern. 
From this perspective, the Colorado restriction interferes with less 
speech than other health and safety related speech regulations that 
have previously been upheld, including the restriction of all 
fairground handbilling to a limited number of booths upheld in 
 
 129. Id. (citing Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 772–73 (1994)). 
 130. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 377–78 (1997). 
 131. Hill, 530 U.S. at 727. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) (emphasis added). 
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Heffron, and other commonplace ordinances requiring silence near 
hospitals.134 Thus, in light of Colorado’s strong interest in regulation 
and the minimal burdens imposed on expression, it should come as 
little surprise that the court upheld the statute. 
B. The Colorado Cure for Clark County Canvassing 
A Clark County ordinance closely resembling Colorado’s eight-
foot rule would likely reach enough obstructive canvassing to 
significantly curb its concerning effects and survive a First 
Amendment challenge. Of course, to achieve success on the Strip, 
commissioners would have to alter certain provisions to some 
degree. Such modifications, however, need not make the statute 
more restrictive than the Colorado version. For example, in order to 
adequately address the Strip’s narrow sidewalks, the first portion of 
the ordinance could be reworked to provide: 
No person shall knowingly approach another person within eight 
feet of such person, or where space restrictions do not permit safely 
maintaining such a separation, then a distance not less than safety 
will permit, unless such other person consents, for the purpose of 
passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to. . . . 
Strictly speaking, a statute providing this exception to the default 
eight-foot requirement would actually impose less of a burden on 
handbillers than the Colorado statute, because where applicable, it 
would allow them to get closer to their intended audience. However, 
at first glance, it also seems that such an exception would dilute the 
effectiveness of the ordinance. After all, assuming that the “safest 
possible distance” is on the edges of the sidewalk, then wherever the 
exception applies, canvassers are free to remain within an arm’s 
length of passersby. 
Nonetheless, such a statute would dramatically improve the 
status quo on the Strip in at least two ways. First, it would give 
commissioners and property owners an incentive to limit the 
applicability of the exception. This could be done by creating special 
canvassing “safe” zones carved out of public and private property 
abutting the problematic sections of sidewalk within the statute’s 
reach. In these areas, canvassers would be forced to maintain a 
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greater distance—if not the full eight feet—from pedestrians, unless a 
pedestrian publicly consented to an approach. This physical 
separation alone would alleviate much of the congestion in popular 
canvassing areas, and it could be created at any location within the 
statute’s reach. Thus, after determining the statute’s geographic 
scope, the county could, with the cooperation of property owners, 
force a physical gap between canvassers and pedestrians on an as 
needed basis. This sort of adaptability would allow the county to 
keep pace with peripatetic canvassers. 
Second, even in areas where the exception applies, the proposed 
consent requirement would likely result in a significant decrease in 
the number of canvassers. The canvassing model used by outcall 
services requires distributing “the maximum number of 
advertisements at the least cost.”135 When canvassers are free to 
approach and distribute material to all pedestrians, there is an 
incentive to employ enough canvassers to reach each passerby. 
However, when the pool of possible recipients is reduced to those 
who affirmatively consent to a canvasser’s approach, the need for 
canvassers presumably decreases proportionately. Indeed, even under 
the charitable assumption that one-third of the Strip’s visitors would 
publicly consent to distribution and that it would take one-third of 
the current canvassing force to elicit that consent, the restriction 
would still effectively reduce the need for canvassers by a two-thirds. 
Certainly, this would eventually result in a corresponding reduction 
in the number of canvassers. 
Furthermore, the consent requirement may cause the canvassing 
model to fail altogether. If canvassers are limited to those who 
publicly consent to an approach, then they are likely to forfeit two 
substantial groups of potential clients: (1) those who would prefer to 
pursue adult entertainment without drawing attention to themselves; 
and (2) those who are not interested in the service until they receive 
the provocative handbill. Without the ability to reach these groups, 
aggressive canvassing could very well become an obsolete method of 
marketing adult services, and this, it seems, is exactly the sort of 
result Clark County intends to achieve.  
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C. The Defensibility of a Clark County Version 
Of course, with the likelihood of imposing such a burden on 
canvassing comes the likelihood of another First Amendment 
challenge. Moreover, while the county has an apparent advantage by 
virtue of the Hill ruling, a successful defense will still require a 
showing that the circumstances prompting the restriction are 
analogous to those at issue in Colorado. To create this analogy, the 
county will have to demonstrate a comparable interest in restricting 
aggressive canvassing and similarly tailor the geographic reach of the 
regulation. Additionally, the county will also want to consider and 
preempt possible First Amendment challenges by including 
additional temporal limitations in its version. 
Clark County’s biggest risk in relying on Hill is that a court 
could be persuaded that the troubling situation on the Strip is not as 
significant as the situation faced by the Colorado legislature. 
However, a plausible argument could be made that, at bottom, Clark 
County and Colorado are seeking to protect almost identical 
interests. In order to frame such an argument, the County will want 
to clearly identify the restriction as a legislative balancing of its 
interest in protecting pedestrians’ right to proceed without 
obstruction and the speaker’s right to reach a willing audience. 
1. The State’s interest in a reasonable restriction 
Of course, canvassers will likely contend that the right to proceed 
without obstruction is not implicated to the same degree that it was 
in Hill. Presumably, they will attempt to distinguish themselves from 
abortion protestors by arguing that their expressive tactics do not 
infringe on the “right to be let alone.” To do so, they will likely 
assert that, unlike abortion protestors, individual canvassers rarely, if 
ever, importune, follow, intimidate, or physically obstruct, after an 
offered handbill has been declined.136 While there may be some truth 
to this distinction, it does not allow canvassers to escape the fact that 
the net effect of their operation is the obstruction of pedestrians on 
Las Vegas Boulevard. Indeed, while the conduct of individual 
canvassers may not rise to the level of importuning or physically 
obstructing unwilling listeners, the same cannot be said of the tactics 
intentionally employed by a canvassing company taken as a whole. As 
 
 136. See id. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
1320 
pedestrians attempt to proceed along the Strip, they are frequently 
delayed by groups of canvassers offering handbills. When an offer 
from a canvasser is refused, a co-canvasser approaches and makes an 
identical offer; when that offer is rejected, the process repeats.137 
Surely, this orchestrated effort to generate a profit by importuning 
and obstructing pedestrians is no less repugnant to Brandeis’ beloved 
“right to be let alone” than the similar conduct of individual right-
to-life demonstrators. In fact, it may well be that this sophisticated 
attempt to force provocative quasi-commercial speech on an 
unwilling listener is even more offensive than the aggressive delivery 
of sociopolitical expression. From this perspective, Clark County’s 
interest in protecting pedestrians from obstruction caused by 
unwanted speech appears to be similar in significance to the interest 
that persuaded the Court in Hill. 
Responding to this argument, canvassers might contend that a 
pedestrian’s refusal of a handbill is distinguishable from the 
“unwillingness” of the protected audience in Colorado because the 
canvasser’s handbill is less likely to elicit a confrontational, emotional 
response. Essentially, this argument would presuppose that the 
handbilling on the Strip is not as inherently offensive as the emotive 
language and gruesome images that often accompany anti-abortion 
demonstrations. Thus, it implicitly suggests that because pedestrians 
are less likely to be offended by nearly pornographic handbills, their 
refusal is somehow less indicative of their unwillingness. Whatever 
merit this claim might have, it applies only when a pedestrian refuses 
a handbill without recognizing its content, because once content is 
purposely refused, the recipient’s unwillingness is unquestionable. Of 
course, as a practical matter, it seems that it would be rare for a 
pedestrian to be entirely ignorant of the content of the refused 
handbill—particularly when surrounded by groups of canvassers clad 
in shirts reading “Girls Direct To You In 20 Minutes.”138 However, 
even assuming that this ignorance is common, the degree to which 
the content is offensive is unlikely to affect the court’s analysis, 
because, as the Hill court explained, “[i]t may not be the content of 
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the speech, as much as the deliberate ‘verbal or visual assault,’ that 
justifies proscription.”139 
Furthermore, even if challengers convince the court that the 
difference in content is somehow relevant, it remains problematic to 
use likelihood of offense to establish pedestrian unwillingness. 
Although it may be true that people are generally uncomfortable 
when forced to view images of aborted fetuses, the same may be true 
of people forced to view images of objectified young women 
juxtaposed with language suggestive of prostitution.140 In fact, it 
stands to reason that those likely to be seriously offended by 
gruesome abortion imagery—including those who stringently 
oppose abortion on moral grounds and those who strongly support 
women’s freedoms—are also those most likely to be offended by 
material depicting young ladies as purchasable goods. That this 
reaction is likely to occur on both ends of the political spectrum is 
indicative of at least one reason that a court would reject using the 
probability of offense to determine whether a pedestrian was truly 
unwilling to receive a rejected handbill. Such a subjective standard 
would require the court to assume that pedestrians generally prefer 
certain images to others. While courts typically refuse to make such 
value judgments, in this case, where the probability of offense is so 
unpredictable, judges are likely to be particularly repulsed. 
2. Reasonable tailoring 
Because challengers are unlikely to find a relevant way to 
meaningfully distinguish obstructive canvassing from obstructive 
protesting, county officials should anticipate an attack on the 
restriction’s tailoring. Fortunately, an effective version of the statute 
upheld in Hill need not burden any additional types of speech. In 
fact, because commissioners can achieve the desired goal while 
omitting certain provisions of the Colorado ordinance, they will 
want to do so in order to be sure that no unnecessary speech is 
burdened. For example, to avoid an over-inclusive challenge, the 
county will need to consider excising the restriction on “oral 
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protest,”141 because although the Hill court found the provision to 
be reasonably tailored to Colorado’s interest, the county’s interest 
probably does not require such a limitation. 
 
a. Geographic tailoring. In addition to tailoring the types of 
speech it will regulate, Commissioners will also need to carefully and 
explicitly define the exact locations where the new ordinance will 
apply. Fortunately, the Colorado statute also provides an adaptable 
example of reasonable geographic tailoring. As a starting point, it is 
important to note that the restriction at issue in Hill did not apply 
only to clinics performing abortion services; instead, it extended to 
all healthcare facilities.142 This distinction is noteworthy because it 
suggests that the court is unlikely to require similar statutes to be 
applicable only where obstruction has previously occurred. Indeed, 
Hill seems to indicate that such restrictions are reasonably tailored 
when imposed within one hundred feet of any location where the 
legitimate interest is implicated.143 Concurring with the Hill 
Judgment, Justice Souter, joined by Justices O’Connor, Ginsburg, 
and Breyer, explained that while the Colorado statute “was not 
enacted to protect dental patients, [he] [could not] say it [was] 
beyond the State’s interest to do so; someone facing an hour with a 
drill in his tooth may reasonably be protected from the intrusive 
behavior of strangers who are otherwise free to speak.”144 This 
suggests that as long as the ordinance’s geographic reach is clearly 
defined and limited only to areas where the concern for obstruction 
is reasonably implicated, courts will be somewhat deferential to the 
county’s tailoring. 
While challengers may attempt to distinguish resort visitors as 
less vulnerable than those seeking medical attention, it stands to 
reason that the Strip’s pedestrians are at least as susceptible to harm 
as those protected by the Colorado statute. Whereas medical patients 
risk missing an opportunity for treatment, agitating an existing 
condition, or psychological harm, canvassers have caused members of 
their unwilling audience, who are often unfamiliar with their 
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surroundings, to risk life and limb in a dangerous street to avoid the 
unwanted expression.145 
Accordingly, it seems that the county has at least two workable 
options for restricting the geographic reach of a Hill-based 
ordinance. First, acting cautiously, it could limit the restriction to 
reach only carefully defined areas where canvassing has historically 
been obstructive and locations where pedestrians are likely to be 
endangered by obstructive conduct. This sort of tailoring would be 
analogous to further narrowing the reach of the Colorado statute, 
which currently applies within one hundred feet of all healthcare 
facilities, to apply only at facilities where abortions or other 
controversial medical procedures are likely to occur. Moreover, such 
a limited restriction is consistent with the county’s interest because it 
allows for the identification and subsequent regulation of any 
specified area where unrestricted canvassing is likely to unduly 
obstruct pedestrians. This, in theory, would allow for the regulation 
of all heavily traveled sections of the Strip’s narrow sidewalks. Thus, 
taking a cautious approach, the county could adopt an ordinance 
that by analogy is less restrictive than the statute upheld in Hill while 
still restricting enough canvassing to vindicate its interests. 
Accordingly, under Hill, it appears unlikely that such a geographic 
reach could be found unreasonably over- or under-inclusive. 
Second, relying on Justice Souter’s description of Colorado’s 
tailoring, the county could possibly take a more aggressive approach 
by applying its restriction to any location where unregulated 
handbilling could endanger pedestrians. After all, while it seems that 
even the most ardent opponents of dental hygiene are unlikely to 
obstruct dental patients, the Hill majority found it reasonable for 
Colorado to regulate such conduct because dental patients could be 
particularly vulnerable to its effect.146 Of course, Clark County would 
be unwise to interpret this language to support an ordinance 
reaching all sidewalks abutting busy county streets, because although 
obstructive canvassing on any such sidewalk could present dangers 
similar to those on the strip, most courts would be loath to uphold a 
restriction so geographically expansive. However, commissioners 
might be able to impose the ordinance where avoiding unwanted 
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speech could reasonably endanger pedestrians, or, in other words, in 
areas where both canvassing and dangerous traffic would be 
reasonably expected. While any increase in restrictive reach increases 
litigation risks, Hill appears to support a geographic scope at least 
this broad. Moreover, looser tailoring would allow the county to 
regulate off-Strip areas posing similar dangers to tourists, including 
the sections of sidewalk surrounding historic downtown Las Vegas, 
where former Mayor Oscar Goodman has repeatedly attempted to 
regulate outcall canvassing.147 
 
b. Temporal tailoring. In addition to geographic tailoring, county 
officials might also consider adding a final layer of litigation 
protection by limiting the ordinance to apply only at certain times of 
the day. Although Hill suggests that the county would likely satisfy 
the First Amendment’s tailoring requirements by carefully limiting 
both the types of expression restricted and the locations where such 
restrictions apply, a time restriction would only further indicate Clark 
County’s commitment to protecting speech rights. Furthermore, a 
timing restriction need not diminish the ordinance’s ability to reach 
problematic canvassing, because while Las Vegas is the prototypical 
twenty-four hour town, there are certainly times when canvassing 
ebbs. For example, while visitors are known to walk to the Strip until 
the early morning hours, comparatively few continue into the early 
daylight hours. During these few hours, the incentive to canvass 
decreases along with the pedestrian population. Thus, by analyzing 
traffic patterns and canvassing habits, the county may well be able to 
identify specific periods when regulation is wholly unnecessary and 
draft its ordinance accordingly. Therefore, because a temporal 
limitation appears to be a low-cost means of garnering a court’s 
favor, county commissioners would be wise to consider including 
one in future attempts to regulate obstructive canvassing. 
V. CONCLUSION 
With troubling economic conditions already handicapping the 
resort industry, protecting visitors from unwanted, obstructive, and 
otherwise dangerous canvassing has once again become a priority for 
Clark County’s legislature. Moreover, without new regulation, the 
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county actually risks a significant increase in the canvassing presence, 
because the odds favor canvassers in a challenge to their current 
exclusion from privately-owned sidewalks. However, while attempts 
to entirely eradicate canvassing through the commercial speech 
doctrine will likely result in costly defeat, the county does have 
powerful and defensible legislative options. A properly modified 
version of the statute upheld in Hill is not only capable of 
significantly mitigating canvassing concerns, it is also likely to survive 
a First Amendment challenge. And although this author lacks the 
resources necessary to define the precise scope of such legislation, 
county commissioners, using this Comment as a rough guide, will 
likely be able to draft an effective and defensible ordinance restricting 
off-premise canvassing on the Las Vegas Strip. 
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